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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Sasha Martinez argues on appeal that the district court violated her constitutional 
rights, afforded by both the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments, to confront and cross-
examine her co-defendant, Luis Espinoza, when the prosecutor read Mr. Espinoza's 
statement to police into the record at Ms. Martinez's sentencing hearing. She also 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by unreasonably prohibiting her from 
presenting evidence, both at her sentencing hearing and at the hearing on her I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. Finally, she contends that, should all those errors be 
deemed individually harmless, cumulatively, they deprived her of due process 
throughout the criminal prosecution. 
The State's responses are, for the most part, not applicable to the claims 
Ms. Martinez raised. For example, its response to her claim that her Sixth Amendment 
rights were violated was premised on two cases, the analysis of which predated the 
watershed United States Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2006). Crawfords overhaul of the analysis under the Sixth Amendment 
essentially abrogated the cases upon which the State tries to rely. Similarly, the State's 
arguments as to the Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation at sentencing ignores 
precedent on point and relies on a misinterpretation of the dated precedent upon which 
it relies. 
Furthermore, the State's only argument in regard to Ms. Martinez's assertion that 
the district court unreasonably restricted the evidence it considered at her sentencing 
hearing is based on a procedural requirement established by the Idaho Supreme Court 
1 
in regard to motions to reopen a hearing. However, when Ms. Martinez was 
unreasonably denied the opportunity to present evidence at her sentencing hearing, 
the evidentiary period had not yet closed and, therefore, the State's argument is not 
applicable to Ms. Martinez's case. This theme continues with the State's contentions 
regarding the district court's unreasonable rejection of evidence at the Rule 35 hearing. 
The State cites precedent which dealt with the district court's initial decision to hold a 
hearing on a Rule 35 motion. However, the State ignores the precedent which holds 
that once the district court decides to have a hearing, as it did in this case, it cannot 
prohibit the presentation of evidence in support of that motion. 
Finally, in regard to the cumulative error doctrine, the State again ignores 
precedent demonstrating the right which the cumulative error doctrine protects extends 
to all hearings in the criminal prosecution, which includes sentencing hearings and 
hearings on motions for leniency. The State also misinterprets precedent and tries and 
claim that Ms. Martinez had no due process rights during her Rule 35 hearing, when the 
precedent it relied upon only addressed the initial determination of whether a hearing 
was necessary. 
The State's arguments, mostly inapplicable to the issues presented on appeal 
and based on misinterpretations of precedent, do not undermine Ms. Martinez's claims. 
The district court did not afford Ms. Martinez her constitutional rights to confront an 
adverse witness. It unreasonably restricted the evidence it considered in regard to its 
determination on sentencing. It admitted on the record that it would not accept any new 
evidence in support of Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion, directly contrary to precedent. 
And even if each and everyone of those errors were found individually harmless, 
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cumulatively, they reveal that the criminal prosecution of Ms. Martinez was lacking in 
fundamental fairness. For any or all of those reasons, this Court should vacate her 
sentence and remand her case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Martinez's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erroneously permitted Mr. Espinoza's statement to be 
read into the record without affording Ms. Martinez the opportunity to confront 
Mr. Espinoza or present rebuttal evidence. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by improperly limiting the 
evidence available, both at the sentencing hearing and the Rule 35 hearing. 
3. Whether the district court's numerous errors entitle Ms. Martinez to relief 




The District Court Erroneously Permitted Mr. Espinoza's Statement To Be Read 
Into The Record Without Affording Ms. Martinez The Opportunity To Confront 
Mr. Espinoza Or Present Rebuttal Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Martinez argues that there are two constitutional provisions which guarantee 
the right to confrontation at sentencing - the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause 
and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In regard to the Sixth 
Amendment's protections, the only cases the State cites predate the watershed 
decision from the United States Supreme Court which redefined the analysis applicable 
to the Confrontation Clause - Crawford v. Washington. The authority upon which the 
State relies applied the old analysis, and thus were abrogated by Crawford and its 
progeny. In fact, the State is arguing that the very evil Crawford sought to prevent - the 
use of ex parte examinations of a witness as evidence against the defendant - should 
be allowed by the Idaho courts. Application of the proper analysis reveals that the 
State's argument is erroneous and should be rejected. 
In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment's protections, the State relies on a 
misinterpretation of one case. Additionally, the State fails to respond to the analysis 
Ms. Martinez provided on that point. A proper reading of precedent, when applied to 
Ms. Martinez's case, reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections extend to 
her. 
In regard to either of these constitutional protections, the district court violated 
Ms. Martinez's constitutional rights when it allowed the State to read Mr. Espinoza's 
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out-of-court, testimonial statements into the record without providing Ms. Martinez an 
opportunity to confront and cross-examine him about those statements. 
B. The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront 
The Witness Against Her 
The State's only response to Ms. Martinez's arguments concerning the Sixth 
Amendment right to confrontation is to point to two Idaho decisions, one from 1986 and 
the other from 1991. (Resp. Br., p.5 (referring to Sivakv. State, 112 Idaho 197 (1986), 
and State v. Wolverton, 120 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 1991).) Both of those cases 
concerning the right to confrontation at sentencing were based on the fact that the 
defendant could still challenge the reliability of hearsay statements introduced 
at sentencing without cross-examining the declarant. See Sivak, 112 Idaho at 215 
("[The defendant] need not have the actual live witnesses whose statements are 
contained in the report present at the sentencing hearing so long as he is afforded the 
opportunity to explain and to argue the veracity of those statements before the 
sentencing judge.") (emphasis added); Wolverton, 120 Idaho at 563 ("Hearsay 
information in a report must be disregarded if there is no reasonable basis to deem the 
information reliable or if the information is the product of conjecture or speculation.") 
(emphasis added). 
However, the State ignores the watershed decision from the United States 
Supreme Court in 2004 - Crawford v. Washington - which redefined the entire 
framework for discussing and analyzing the right bestowed by the Confrontation Clause. 
As a result, earlier cases (such as Sivak and Wolverton), which relied on the 
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now-outdated analysis, are no longer controlling as to the scope and application of the 
Confrontation Clause's protections. 
In fact, the "principle evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the 
civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused."1 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50; see id. at 44-46 (discussing 
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as an example of a violation of the Confrontation Clause 
because the court allowed consideration of the written statement of Raleigh's co-
defendant without allowing Raleigh to subject that person to cross-examination). 
Nevertheless, that is exactly what the State proffered as evidence in this case - an 
ex parte statement produced during a custodial examination. See id. at 50; 
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143 (2007) (recognizing that such statements are 
classified as one of the "core" formulations of testimonial statements invoking the 
protection of the Confrontation Clause). The admission of that evidence without allowing 
for confrontation in this case, a modern-day equivalent of the Raleigh case, violated 
Ms. Martinez's rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
Therefore, since it is clear post-Crawford that Mr. Espinoza's statements, made 
while he was in custody, are inadmissible testimonial statements, the only question 
remaining is whether Crawford's protections extend to sentencing hearings. As in 
Crawford, this analysis begins with a return to the Amendment itself, which provides that 
1 Essentially, the point of the Confrontation Clause is to prevent a defendant from being 
subjected to trial and punishment based upon the unchallenged statements of a 
co-defendant, which was made to police out of court. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64. 
Ms. Martinez was subjected to punishment based on the unchallenged statements 
of her co-defendant, Mr. Espinoza, which were made out of court. (See Tr., p.53, 
L.21 - p.54, L.4.) 
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"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend VI. The term "criminal prosecution" 
has, and continues to refer to all stages of the prosecution process, which includes 
sentencing. See, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 288, 
288-406 (1765-1769) at 375, 406 (identifying judgment and punishment as one of the 
final stages of the criminal prosecution); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) 
(holding that defendants at probation revocations do not get the full panoply of rights 
because the probation revocation occurs after "the end of the criminal prosecution, 
including imposition of sentence"). Therefore, because sentencing determinations are 
part of the criminal prosecution, the protections granted by the Confrontation Clause 
extend to those hearings as well. 2 As that right was violated by the district court's 
decision to not allow Ms. Martinez the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Espinoza 
(see generally Tr., pp.53-54), this Court should vacate her sentence and remand her 
case for a new sentencing hearing. 
C. The District Court Violated Ms. Martinez's Federal Constitutional Rights To Due 
Process By Denying Her The Opportunity To Confront The Witness Against Her 
Even if the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply at sentencing, 
Ms. Martinez also had a right to due process at her sentencing hearing. State v. Coutts, 
101 Idaho 110, 117 n.1 0 (1980) ("It is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as 
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.") (quoting 
2 This is particularly important in the era of plea agreements, as the sentencing hearing 
provides the only opportunity for the State to present its evidence and for the defendant 
to exercise her constitutional rights in regard to that evidence. (See App. Br., at 8, 
8 n.2.) 
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Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977)). Both the United States Supreme Court 
and the Idaho Supreme Court have recognized that "the right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process." 
Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1969); State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 767 
(2007) (recognizing confrontation is an aspect of due process, specifically during a 
probation revocation hearing); State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 90 (Ct. App. 2011) 
(recognizing that the due process right to confront witnesses would extend to 
sentencing hearings where the defendant makes a showing that the challenged 
information is materially untrue).3 That right may be limited in the sentencing hearings 
or subsequent hearings (such as probation revocation) where there are "earmarks of 
reliability" in the statements proffered.4 Rose, 144 Idaho at 767 (quoting Young v. 
United States, 863 A2d 804, 808 (D.C. 2004) (in turn quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 
481 )). However, the statement proffered in this case, that of a co-defendant, is 
inherently unreliable because of the co-defendant's inherent motives to lie, meaning that 
the defendant needs to be able to cross examine in regard to such statements in order 
to satisfy the requirements of due process. See State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 584 
(1980); State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 890,891 (2009); Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46,49 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
3 A difficult task, if the defendant is barred from presenting rebuttal evidence against the 
statements, as happened in this case. (Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.57, L.13.) 
4 Because this right is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment, as opposed to the Sixth 
Amendment, this right to confrontation is independent from the right discussed in 
Crawford. As such, there is no issue regarding the ability to limit the due process right 
based on reliability of the statement, a concern related to the Sixth Amendment itself. 
See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. And, as the Idaho Supreme Court recognized, 
numerous other jurisdictions have recognized this independent due process right to 
confrontation. Rose, 144 Idaho at 767-68. 
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The State makes two points in regard to this issue. First, it contends that "due 
process is satisfied when the defendant has the opportunity to address statements in 
the PSI." (Resp. Br. at 6.) However, it does not cite any authority for that argument. 
As such, it should be disregarded, particularly since it is an over-simplistic statement of 
the law. Due process requires a "full opportunity" to address such information, which 
consists of the opportunity "to present favorable evidence" as well as "to explain 
and rebut adverse evidence." See, e.g., State v. Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 1043 
(Ct. App. 1985) (quoting State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 (1969)); State v. Wheeler, 129 
Idaho 735, 739 (Ct. App. 1997). That is what Ms. Martinez was trying to get from the 
district court - a full opportunity to rebut adverse evidence and to present favorable 
evidence: 
[DEFENSE COUSNEL]: Again, Your Honor, I just want to make the same 
argument. ... this person is not here. He could have been here, and then 
I could cross-examine him. 
I didn't know [the prosecutor] was going to go into a hearsay report and 
talk about all these things, but I'm just telling you [one of the other people 
involved in the crime] is here and would testify and clear a lot of those 
facts up. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to get into it now. 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.21-24, p.57, Ls.9-13.) As a result of the district court's decision, 
Ms. Martinez was not afforded the full opportunity, particularly an opportunity to present 
favorable evidence in response to the adverse evidence, as required by due process. 
See Morgan, 109 Idaho at 1043; Moore, 93 Idaho at 17; Wheeler, 129 Idaho at 739. 
Second, the State's only other contention in regard to the due process right to 
confrontation is based on a misinterpretation of Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
250-51 (1949). (Resp. Sr., at 5.) The State asserts that Williams stands for the 
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proposition that "[d]ue process likewise does not require live testimony subject to 
cross-examination at sentencing." (Resp. Br., at 5.) The Williams opinion does not 
make such a holding, particularly in regard to the particular challenge presented in this 
case: whether due process requires the opportunity to cross-examine a declarant-
witness on an inherently unreliable statement presented at sentencing. (See App. 
Br., pp.10-13.) 
Rather, the Williams Court was focused on the issue of whether the federal 
constitution would prevent the district court from considering evidence at sentencing 
which was provided in a "probation report" which "[drew] on information concerning 
every aspect of the defendant's life," where that evidence was not presented via live 
testimony subject to cross-examination. Williams, 337 U.S. at 250. The Williams Court 
described the probation report as a document which would contain information about 
the defendant's: 
(1) Offense; (2) Prior Record; (3) Family History; (4) Home and 
Neighborhood; (5) Education; (6) Religion; (7) Interests and Activities; 
(8) Health (physical and mental); (9) Employment; (10) Resources; 
(11) Summary; (12) Plan; and (13) Agencies Interested. Each of the 
headings is further broken down into sub-headings. The form represents a 
framework into which information can be inserted to give the sentencing 
judge a composite picture of the defendant. 
Williams, 337 U.S. at 250 n.15. Based on that description, the probation report 
appears to be akin to Idaho's presentence investigation reports. See id. Hearsay 
evidence may be presented in such documents, provided that the information is reliable. 
State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 183 (1991); Reid, 151 Idaho at 88-89; see also 
United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to assure that the 
information is reliable, "the defendant is afforded the opportunity to present favorable 
11 
evidence and to explain or rebut the adverse information." State v. Carey, 152 Idaho 
720, 721 (Ct. App. 2012). That is essentially the same concern that the United States 
Supreme Court had in Williams: 
[Those] reports have been given a high value by conscientious judges 
who want to sentence persons on the best evidence available rather than 
on guess work and inadequate information . ... We must recognize that 
most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the 
intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information 
were restricted to that [evidence] given in open court by witnesses subject 
to cross-examination .... The type and extent of this information make 
totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with cross-
examination. 
Williams, 337 U.S. at 250 (emphasis added). Idaho has simply defined the 
requirements necessary to ensure such information is adequate and reliable. 
See Mauro, 121 Idaho at 183; Carey, 152 Idaho at 721; Rose, 144 Idaho at 767. 
As such, the due process right to confrontation exists, though limited, post-Williams. 
I n fact, Williams is reconcilable with Rose and Reid - where the proffered statements 
bear the earmarks of reliability, there is no due process requirement for cross-
examination of the declarant-witness, but where the proffered statements do not bear 
the earmarks of reliability, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant-witness. Williams, 337 U.S. at 250; Rose, 144 Idaho at 767; 
Reid, 151 Idaho at 90. In the case that cross-examination does not happen when such 
cross-examination is necessary to ensure the proffered statement is reliable, the 
defendant has been deprived of her constitutional right to due process. Rose, 144 
Idaho at 767; Reid, 151 Idaho at 90. 
In this case, the proffered evidence is a co-defendant's statement made to police 
during a custodial interrogation. (See Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.5.) A co-defendant's 
12 
statements are inherently unreliable because of the various motivations to lie. 
See, e.g., Johnson, 101 Idaho at 584; Stone, 147 Idaho at 891; Matthews, 136 Idaho 
at 49. As such, Ms. Martinez needed to be able to cross-examine Mr. Espinoza to 
ensure the evidence the district court considered was reliable. See, e.g., Reid, 151 
Idaho at 90. As that opportunity was denied her (Tr., p.53, L.21 - p.54, L.5), she has 
been denied her constitutional rights to due process. See Rose, 144 Idaho at 767; Reid, 
151 Idaho at 88-89. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Improperly Limiting The Evidence Available, 
Both At The Sentencing Hearing And The Rule 35 Hearing 
A. Introduction 
The district court improperly restricted the evidence presented for its 
consideration at the sentencing hearing and at the subsequent Rule 35 hearing. 
In regard to the sentencing hearing, the State's only argument for affirming the district 
court's actions is that Ms. Martinez needed to show some reason for the district court to 
reopen the evidentiary portion of that hearing. The major problem with the State's 
argument is that the evidentiary period had not yet closed when Ms. Martinez requested 
the opportunity to rebut the evidence the State had read into the record and, therefore, 
the procedural rule which the State advocates is inapplicable in this case. Because it 
did not provide any argument as to the substance of Ms. Martinez's contentions, any 
such argument should be deemed to be waived. Therefore, based on Ms. Martinez's 
uncontested arguments, this Court should remedy the abuse of discretion caused by the 
district court's unreasonable restriction of the evidence at the sentencing hearing. 
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In regard to the Rule 35 hearing, the State asserts that there was no abuse of 
discretion because no additional evidence need be considered when the defendant 
moves for leniency pursuant to Rule 35, as the district court is authorized to rule on a 
Rule 35 motion without a hearing. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held exactly 
opposite, requiring that, when moving for Rule 35 relief, the defendant present new or 
additional evidence in support of that motion. The authorities to which the State cites 
are inapplicable to Ms. Martinez's case because those opinions address whether the 
district court needs to hold a hearing, not its decisions regarding the presentation of 
evidence at a hearing it has decided to hold. The case law is clear that once it decides 
to hold a hearing, the district court abuses its discretion if it unreasonably limits the 
evidence proffered, particularly in light of the requirement that the defendant provide 
new and additional evidence to support the motion. Therefore, the district court's 
unreasonable decision to not allow Ms. Martinez to present the new and additional 
evidence in support of her motion was an abuse of discretion, and should be remedied. 
B. In Regard To The District Court's Unreasonable Restriction Of Presented 
Evidence At The Sentencing Hearing. The State's Argument Regarding The 
Limitations Established In Printcraft Are Inapplicable To Ms. Martinez's Case 
Because She Was Not Moving To Reopen The Evidentiary Period Of That 
Hearing 
The State's only argument in regard to this issue is that, based on the recent 
Idaho Supreme Court decision in Prinfcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 
153 Idaho 440, 458-59 (2012), reh'g denied, Ms. Martinez would have needed to show 
a reasonable excuse to have the district court reopen the hearing and accept new 
evidence. That argument is inapplicable to Ms. Martinez's request to present evidence 
at the sentencing hearing because she was not moving to reopen the sentencing 
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hearing; she was requesting the opportunity to rebut the State's evidence before that 
hearing closed. Basically, in order for the Printcraft rule to apply in a particular case, the 
party moving to reopen the evidentiary period must have already rested its case and the 
court entered a ruling (otherwise, there has been nothing closed, and so nothing to 
reopen).5 See id. at 458 ("Printcraft rested its case in chief without presenting any 
evidence in support of its claim .... the district court's decision was rendered on the 
basis that Printcraft had rested its case without presenting evidence.") 
However, the evidentiary period of Ms. Martinez's sentencing hearing had not 
yet closed (i.e., counsel had not submitted the matter to the district court for its 
decision), nor had the district court rendered its decision in regard to the imposition of 
sentence when Ms. Martinez made her request to present Ms. Lopez's testimony. 
(See generally Tr., pp. 57 -64.) Because the evidentiary period of that hearing was still 
open (for example, Ms. Martinez had yet to be afforded the opportunity to make her 
statements of allocution to the district court), Printcraffs restrictions on the presentation 
of evidence do not apply. In fact, Ms. Martinez was attempting to rebut the evidence the 
prosecutor had just finished presenting. (Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.57, L.13.) 
5 It appears that the State only argued Printcraffs restriction in regard to the district 
court's decision to prevent the additional presentation of evidence at sentencing. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.6-12.) However, to the extent that it had tried to argue Printcraft 
in regard to the district court's decision to prevent the presentation of evidence at the 
Rule 35 hearing, Printcraft is inapplicable. Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion was a new 
motion which has a requirement that the movant present new or additional evidence in 
support of her motion. See, e.g., State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
Ms. Martinez requested the opportunity to do exactly that. (Tr. p.72, L.20 - p.73, L.8.) 
As such, there was no motion to reopen in regard to the Rule 35 hearing, and thus, 
Printcraft is inapplicable to that hearing as well. 
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Additionally, the parties are not expected to preempt and present evidence on 
every possible alternative argument the other party might argue; that is the purpose of 
affording the first party to present evidence the opportunity of a rebuttal. See, e.g., 
AI/en v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 12 Idaho 653, 88 P. 245, 248-49 (1906); cf 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011) (recognizing that a prosecutor may not 
present evidence of post-Miranda silence unless the defendant has already testified and 
that evidence is introduce to impeach the defendant's testimony); State v. Butcher, 137 
Idaho 125, 133 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the testimony of a rebuttal witness could 
properly be presented because of the arguments the defense made during its case-in-
chief, regardless of whether that testimony might have been presented during the 
State's case-in-chief). 
Therefore, because the district court refused to give Ms. Martinez that 
opportunity, which is not subject to Printcraft, it unreasonably limited the evidence it 
would consider in terms of sentencing.6 That constitutes an abuse of its discretion, 
which this Court should remedy. 
C. In Regard To The District Court's Unreasonable Restriction Of Presented 
Evidence At The Rule 35 Hearing, Because The Defendant Must Present New 
And Additional Evidence To Support A Rule 35 Motion, The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion By Limiting The Presentation Of That Evidence Once It 
Decides To Hold A Hearing 
As with its arguments regarding the district court's unreasonable limitation of the 
evidence at the sentencing hearing, the State does not address the substantive points 
6 As the State provided no argument in regard to the substantive issue of the district 
court's unreasonable limitation of its discretion, Ms. Martinez simply refers this Court 
back to the uncontested arguments set forth in her Appellant's Brief in this regard. 
(App. Br., pp.13-16). 
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in Ms. Martinez's arguments on this issue, but bases its position entirely on an 
inapplicable procedural point. Therefore, any argument as to the substantive issues 
should be deemed waived, and the uncontested points demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion. 
The State's argument on this issue focuses on a procedural restriction from 
State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998). (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) The State 
misreads Bayles and asserts that, before testimony may be presented at a hearing 
which the district court has already determined is necessary, the defendant must first 
present an offer of proof so that the district court might determine whether that evidence 
need be presented. (See Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) However, Bayles only requires that '''[a] 
Rule 35 movant wishing to submit additional evidence should make an 'offer of proof' in 
the motion itself or by an accompanying affidavit to enable the district judge to make a 
reasoned decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing . . . . '" Bayles, 131 
Idaho at 626 (quoting State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323,328 (Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis in 
italics from original, emphasis in bold added). The question presented in both Bayles 
and Fortin was whether the district court needed to hold a hearing. See id.; Fortin, 124 
Idaho at 328. 
However, as both Bayles and Fortin recognize, once the district court decides to 
hold a hearing on a Rule 35 motion, it cannot unduly limit the relevant evidence 
proffered for its consideration. Id.; see also State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 824 
(Ct. App. 2008). In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court recently made the law regarding 
Rule 35 motions abundantly clear: "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant 
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
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subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). Therefore, where the district court 
decides to hold a hearing, it cannot prevent the defendant from presenting evidence in 
support of her Rule 35 motion. 
Because the district court decided to hold a hearing in this case (R., p.74), if the 
district court unreasonably restricted the relevant evidence, it abused its discretion. 
See, e.g., Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626; Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. In this case, the 
district court's abuse of discretion is demonstrated in two ways. First, "[w]hen a judge 
refuses to consider any additional information, he erroneously narrows the scope of his 
own discretion." State v. Bonaparte, 114 Idaho 577, 582 (Ct. App. 1988). That is 
exactly what the district court did in this case: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 
[Ms. Martinez's] mother. 
I have a witness I would like to call, 
THE COURT: Well, this is not an evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary 
hearing was held at the facility. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: All Right. 
THE COURT: And I don't do a new evidentiary hearing. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. You don't allow anything additional? 
THE COURT: I do not. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.72, L.22 - p.73, L.7 (emphasis added).) As evidenced by its statements on 
the record, the district court refused to accept any additional information proffered at 
the hearing on Ms. Martinez's Rule 35 motion, which is a clear abuse of discretion. 
Bonaparte, 1214 Idaho at 582; Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626. 
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Second, hearings on Rule 35 motions for lenience are governed by the same 
standards as the original sentence. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). 
To that end, the evidence relevant to sentencing is "largely unlimited." State v. Leon, 
142 Idaho 709 (2006); see also Brown, 121 Idaho at 391. Therefore, as it is at 
sentencing, the evidence relevant to a Rule 35 motion for leniency is largely unlimited. 
See, e.g., State v. Findeisen, 119 Idaho 903, 905 (Ct. App. 1991) (indicating facts about 
the defendant's good character is relevant to a decision in a Rule 35 motion for 
leniency). Therefore, even without the district court's outright statements which 
demonstrate the abuse of its discretion, the fact that it refused to receive and consider 
relevant evidence proffered in support of a Rule 35 motion shows the abuse of its 
discretion. Bayles, 131 Idaho at 626; Izaguirre, 145 Idaho at 824. 
III. 
The District Court's Numerous Errors Entitle Ms. Martinez To Relief Pursuant To The 
Cumulative Error Doctrine 
A. Introduction 
There are several errors demonstrated in sections I and II, anyone of which 
should justify relief from this Court. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds those 
errors to have been individually harmless, Ms. Martinez asserts that the errors 
combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine speaks in terms 
of the deprivation of fairness and due process throughout the course of proceedings, 
and so can be accumulated across hearings. Ms. Martinez had a due process right at 
her sentencing hearing. And, once the district court decided to hold a hearing on her 
Rule 35 motion, she also had a right to due process in that hearing. Therefore, even if 
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the errors established in sections I and II were harmless, the conglomeration of errors 
should justify relief. 
B. The Cumulative Error Doctrine Should Apply To Sentencing And Rule 35 
Hearings 
The cumulative error doctrine deals with the defendant's right to due process. 
See, e.g., State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,723 (2009). That right extends throughout 
the entire criminal prosecution, guaranteeing the entire process is fundamentally fair. 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). As noted in Section I(C) supra, the 
sentencing hearing is part of the criminal process, and thus, must comply with the due 
process protections. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358; Coutts, 101 Idaho at 117 n.10. And 
since a Rule 35 motion for leniency asserts error in the sentencing decision, see 
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, it should be considered part of the sentencing process, and 
thus, part of the criminal prosecution, as several other courts have recognized? 
See, e.g., United States v. Lightly, 616 F.3d 321, 371 (4th Cir. 2010); United 
7 This is particularly true once the district court decides to hold a hearing. Once a 
hearing has been deemed necessary, that hearing must comport with due process. 
See, e.g., Tolman v. State, 128 Idaho 643,646 (Ct. App. 1996). The State ignores that 
precedent, and again argues a misconstrued interpretation of State v. Coassolo, 
136 Idaho 138 (2001). The State asserts that, because there is never a due process 
right at issue in regard to a Rule 35 motion, no error therein could be accumulated. 
(Resp. Br., at 14). Beside the fact that this is not a relinquishment of jurisdiction case, 
which would make Coassolo inapplicable, Coassolo only holds that there is no due 
process right to have a hearing when the district court decides to relinquish jurisdiction. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho at 143 ("The district judge may then, if the judge feels it necessary, 
hold a hearing, but it is not constitutionally necessary.") However, since the district 
court did hold a hearing in this case, the Coassolo analysis is inapplicable, and the 
State's argument irrelevant to the issues now on appeal. Precedent remains clear: 
once the district court decides to hold that hearing, the hearing must comport with due 
process. See, e.g., Walton, 497 U.S. at 687; Tolman, 128 Idaho at 646. A deprivation of 
that right demands a remedy. See Tolman, 128 Idaho at 646. 
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States v. Santos, 369 Fed.Appx. 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2010); Gargle V. Mallin, 317 F.3d 
1196,1223 (10th Cir. 2003); United States V. Lee, 268 Fed.Appx. 813, 816-17 
(11th Cir. 2008); see Walton V. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 687 (1990), overruled on other 
grounds by Ring V. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (reviewing a determination on a 
motion for leniency for comport with the due process requirements); see also 
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462 (2002) (recognizing that due process requires "all 
people charged with a crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality 
before the bar of justice in every American court.'" (quoting Griffin v. !fIinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 17 (1956)) (emphasis added)).8 As such, the appropriate scope of 
consideration in the cumulative error doctrine is whether the defendant was afforded a 
fundamentally fair process throughout the criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Severson, 
147 Idaho at 723; see also Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485. 
The accumulation of errors throughout that process demonstrate that 
Ms. Martinez was not afforded a fundamentally fair process because she was not given 
a full and fair opportunity to present evidence in support of her positions or to counter 
the State's evidence. That deprived her of her due process rights throughout the 
criminal prosecution, and thus, the cumulative error doctrine would allow for a remedy in 
the event that each of those errors was found individually harmless. 
8 There is no exception for courts sitting in certain types of hearings; due process 
extends to all hearings before a court of law. Strand, 137 Idaho at 462. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate her sentence and 
remand her case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2012. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
22 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3rd day of December, 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
SASHA DEE MARTINEZ 
INMATE #100200 
PWCC 
1451 FORE ROAD 
POCATELLO 1083204 
JON J SHINDURLING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KEVIN C PETERSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, 10 83720-0010 
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court. 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
BRD/eas 
23 
